This volume offers a collection of in-depth explorations of pragmatism as a framework for discussions in philosophy of science and metaphysics. Each chapter involves explicit reflection on what it means to be pragmatist, and how to use pragmatism as a guiding framework in addressing topics such as realism, unification, fundamentality, truth, laws, reduction, and more. -/- .

Suzanne Langer's earlier works on the philosophy of art, particularly her Feeling and Form, are the points of departure for this general study of the phenomena of life and mind which she clearly intends to be her magnum opus. This is the first of two volumes, the second volume as yet unpublished. Her main thesis is that the "departure [of man] from the normal pattern of animal mentality is a vast and special evolution of feeling in the hominoid stock". She (...) opposes all attempts to bifurcate nature into matter and mind, and in this regard aligns herself with the main currents of contemporary thought. But the centrality she gives to the notion of feeling is uniquely her own, separating her views from those of most other contemporary thinkers and providing the most controversial part of her book. In different places throughout the work, the term "feeling" includes within its scope "sensation," "inward tension," "pain," "emotion," "intent," and a number of other phenomena. Critics of the work will no doubt argue that the theory cannot overcome the vagueness engendered by giving this central concept such a wide scope. But before making a final judgment on this point they will have to pay special attention to the second and third parts of this book where her concept of feeling slowly takes shape through reflection on the arts and on the nature of living things. In a second volume she promises to move beyond living things in general to the distinctive features of human consciousness. A second respect in which this work differs from much other writing in the philosophy of mind is the wealth of references and examples from the biological and psychological sciences which display the encyclopedic interests and openness which have always characterized Suzanne Langer's writings.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The translator has collected passages from the varied corpus of Schweitzer's writing and has pieced them together into a brief but impressive sketch of the man and the thinker. Some sections are autobiographical; others contain Schweitzer's thoughts on Africa, world peace, on Goethe and Bach among historical figures, and a few of his basic philosophical ideas. An index provides references to the original works.--R. H. K.

Foundations research in physics, according to Bunge, has lagged behind its sister discipline, the foundations of mathematics. His book is an attempt to partially remedy this situation by analyzing the form and content of some basic ideas in physics and presenting some of the fundamental theories of physics in an axiomatic fashion. The heart of the book consists of axiomatizations of Classical Mechanics, Classical Field Theories, and Quantum Mechanics. Bunge does not claim to be working without predecessors. While the idea (...) of a separate discipline in the foundations of physics is rather new, the existence of material that clearly belongs to foundations research is not. This is attested to by the substantial bibliography at the end of the book. But he is ideally suited to the task of bringing this difficult material together and welding it in his own fashion into a coherent whole. His grasp of physical theory is wide-ranging and he writes with clarity and wit. In the first chapter he states his views on a number of issues in the philosophy of science: explanation, prediction, operationalism, laws, and other topics. The arguments are usually summarized very briefly, or reference is made to other books. Thus those who disagree with his philosophical presuppositions will not be convinced; but friends or foes will miss a great deal of informative material if they do not push on to the axiomatizations which follow and which are the main concern of the book. This book will undoubtedly be a source-book for future foundations research in the physical sciences.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Papers collected in this volume were originally presented at a symposium held at the University of Pennsylvania in December, 1968 and revised in the light of discussion at the symposium for publication. The contributors hold different views about the role played by induction in theories of knowledge and rational belief but many of the papers are conciliatory, reflecting no doubt a good deal of helpful communication at the symposium. For example, Frederic Schick's clearly written and informative lead article considers subjectivist, (...) empiricist, and pragmatist theories of rational belief, arguing that they are compatible theories relevant to different types of issues. Marshall Swain follows with an article which presents a general framework within which rules of rational acceptance can be constructed. An exchange between Isaac Levi and Richard Jeffrey shows that advocates of theories of acceptance and theories of partial belief may be defending complementary and not mutually exclusive theories. In the remaining three essays Henry Kyburg Jr., Gilbert Harman, and Keith Lehrer defend their own distinctive views about the nature of inductive inference and rational belief. Kyburg traces difficulties in some theories to the acceptance of the principle of conjunction which he rejects. Harman and Lehrer both see the relation of inductive inference to explanation as crucial to understanding the former and they develop theories along different lines which make use of this relation. A long and useful bibliography was prepared for the symposium by Ralph L. Slaght and revised for publication in the volume.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Those looking for extensive accounts of Islamic theological and philosophical systems will not find them in this survey. It presents rather a historical sketch of the political and social forces operating in the Islamic world, from the time of Mohammed to the present, which gave rise to the basic trends in theology and philosophy. The complexity of these forces will impress the Western reader, and those wanting a background for more detailed study of Islamic philosophers and theologians will find the (...) book useful. The first in a series of volumes on Islamic culture directed to the English-speaking student.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This is a collection of essays written by Hintikka over a period of eight or nine years on logics of existence and on the semantics of modal logics, areas in which he has made pioneer studies. The introductory essay defends formal methods in philosophical analysis. Two essays follow on logics of existence, one of them relating such logics to discussions of the ontological argument. Of the four essays on the semantics of modal logics, the first two "Modality and Quantification" and (...) "The Modes of Modality" discuss the possibilities for philosophical work with the semantics of modal logics generally and the second two "Semantics for Propositional Attitudes" and "Existential Presuppositions and Uniqueness Presuppositions" discuss philosophical applications and try to deal with some of Quine's objections to modal logics. Two final essays apply Hintikka's methods to problems in the philosophy of perception and metaethics. In a paper "On the Logic of Perception" he discusses the nature of immediate perception and sense-data theories and in a paper "Deontic Logic and its Philosophical Morals" he discusses the distinction between prima facie and absolute obligation and John Searle's attempted derivation of "ought" from "is." All essays but this last one have been previously published, but not all in places readily available to English-speaking readers.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Three short essays on the position of the philosopher and philosophy in modern society. Maritain illuminates the situation of the philosopher in a milieu of conflicting systems. The final essay, which deals with the relation of science and religion, shows evidence of a growing appreciation by Maritain of the aims of modern science.--R. H. K.

The much neglected "fifth sense" provides the subject matter for this analytical study. The author distinguishes two kinds of perception associated with this sense, perception by touch and perception of bodily state, and gives an account of the nature of the sensations proper to each. The latter are divided into intransitive bodily sensations and transitive bodily sensations. The greater part of the book is devoted to developing the thesis that bodily sensations can be interpreted as sense impressions of occurrences in (...) our own body.--R. H. K. (shrink)

One of the aims of this book is to bring contemporary research in the neurological and physiological sciences into relationship with discussions in the philosophy of mind. The author does not deny the significance of ordinary talk about the mind, including talk about actions, intentions, beliefs and the like, but he wants to see how this language is compatible with evolutionary and neurophysiological accounts of man. He frequently refers to and accepts Charles Taylor's arguments that "peripheralist" or S-R behavioral theories (...) fail to account for the intentionality of mental states and the teleology of behavior. In fact, one way of reading this book is to see it as an attempt to answer a question raised by Taylor's book: If "peripheralist" theories of behavior cannot account for intentionality and teleology, can a "centralist" or neurophysiological theory of man account for these characteristics? The key chapters of the book attempt to answer this question in the affirmative. The author thinks of the intentionalist characterization of the physical structures of behavior as a "heuristic overlay" on the extensional account of functioning. But the two descriptions, intentional and extensional, are linked together by a series of hypotheses describing the evolutionary source of the functioning. The important problem is to explain how conceptual content or information gets into the neurophysiological picture. The author attempts to deal with this as well as with other problems about the nature of mind including introspection, consciousness, imagery, reasoning, intention, action and language. His discussion of the neurophysiological background for his speculations is purposely general in order to free his conclusions from specific empirical hypotheses about the nervous system which may turn out to be false. This purposeful limitation makes his argument less convincing in some places than it might have been. But he is asking important questions and offering answers to them which deserve careful consideration.--R. H. K. (shrink)

In the introduction to this bibliography of works in the philosophy of science, the author stresses that it provides only the éléments of a bibliography and does not claim to be complete. His aim is to provide a starting point around which interested parties can build their own bibliographies. Although it may be of some use in this regard, philosophers of science in the English-speaking world will not find the volume of very much use for authors writing in English. Some (...) authors are not listed at all and others who do appear have only two or three listings. Examples could be multiplied, but these provide a representative picture of the volume's limitations in this regard. On the other hand, as a preliminary guide to books and articles in the philosophy of science by authors writing in different languages than one's own, the book can be of undoubted usefulness. Works in most of the languages of Western Europe are listed, the majority in French, German and Italian, as well as English.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This anthology collects readings from important nineteenth and early twentieth century figures who contributed to the philosophy of science before that discipline emerged in the last 40 years as an area of study in its own right. It begins with a seldom-read selection by Kant ) and ends with a selection from Bridgman's The Logic of Modern Physics. Each selection is preceded by a three-page biography of the author together with a bibliography of his major writings and some writings on (...) his work. Many familiar names appear, e.g., Mill, Mach, Pearson, Hertz, Poincare, Peirce, Duhem, Russell, Whitehead, and Campbell. But there are others represented whose actual writings are not so familiar to many students of the philosophy of science, e.g., J. F. W. Herschel, William Whewell, Hermann Von Helmholtz, J. B. Stallo, Emile Boutroux and William Ostwald. With the exception of Stallo, the writings of these figures have been long out of print. In one case, a selection from Ludwig Boltzmann on the nature of mechanics, the editor has translated the selected passage into English expressly for this volume. A wide range of topics are considered in the readings: physical laws, theories, induction, observation, space, time, and others; but, as the nature of the case requires, the focus of attention is on classical science. For this reason most existing courses in the philosophy of science could use this collection only as a supplementary text. But it would function well in such a role. Moreover, specialized courses in the history of philosophical thinking about science will find it very useful.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This collection contains twenty-three papers published by Suppes over the last eighteen years. For the most part they are foundational studies ranging over a wide variety of topics in the philosophy of science. The first two of four parts contain papers on methodological issues like models, measurement, probability and utility. There are two papers on models, an axiomatic treatment of extensive quantity and two papers on measurement. The six papers in Part II deal with probability theory and decision theory with (...) reference to theories of behavior, economics, and other topics. Part III contains studies in the axiomatic foundations of physics, one on relativistic kinematics and three on probability in quantum mechanics. The final and longest section contains eight papers on the foundations of psychology. Several of these deal with the psychological or behavioral bases of mathematics. Others deal with unpredictability in human behavior, finite automata, cognition and other topics. The book is nicely printed and those who have learned from Suppes work in the past will be grateful for this collection of his most important papers.--R. H. K. (shrink)

In this book the author develops his own systems of and semantics for presupposition free logic. He calls his systems logics without existence assumptions, by which he means logical systems which are sound and complete with respect to a semantic theory in which a universe of discourse can be empty but any term which denotes must denote something in the universe, all predicates including identity represent relations holding among members of the universe and the quantifiers range over just all the (...) members of the universe. In a brief introductory chapter the author reviews the motivations for constructing non-standard logics of this kind and briefly discusses what he takes to be the limitations of previous work done in the field. Persons interested in the philosophical problems and uses of such logics are likely to find this chapter interesting though disappointingly brief. Four of the eight chapters are devoted to the development of a natural deduction system N which is a logic without existence assumptions in the author's sense. The system N is shown to be sound and complete with respect to the author's semantics. An axiomatic system L is later developed and shown to be equivalent to N. The final chapter is devoted to discussing the relation of his work to many-valued logics, modal logics, intuitionistic logic and the theory of classes among other topics. The author believes that logics without existence assumptions "will in the long run displace the less natural and more narrow standard logics."--R. H. K. (shrink)

Two fundamental theses of sensationalism as a theory of science, formulated by Mach and influential since his time, are critically treated in this analytic study. The first is that the basic elements of experience are sensations, the second that scientific explanation is no more than a complete description of phenomena in terms of sensations. In arguing against these claims the author touches on many important issues in the philosophy of science, including questions about the nature of description and explanation. He (...) argues against the view that there are no pure descriptions, in the sense of descriptions which are free of interpretation.--R. H. K. (shrink)

A book which attempts to introduce the reader to current problems in the philosophy of science, and at the same time to provide a new and significant treatment of some of these problems. The "modest empiricism" which Scheffler has espoused in a number of previous publications is given a detailed presentation in a study of historical attempts to provide meaning for three crucial concepts in the field: explanation, signification and confirmation.--R. H. K.

In this Eddington Memorial lecture, Von Wright distinguishes two points of view from which a logician may study time. The one focuses interest on the order of temporal events and the macro-aspect of time, its flow from an indefinitely remote past through the present to an indefinitely remote future. The other focuses attention on the micro-aspect of time, the nature of the time medium, on questions of whether time is discrete or infinitely divisible or the internal structure of limited time (...) intervals. Von Wright takes the second point of view and as a result his study of time is different in some respects than that of other contemporary tense logicians. Assuming a Tractatus type ontology of possible worlds which can be totally described by stating the existence or non-existence of all possible states of affairs, Von Wright constructs several logical systems, one of discrete time ordering, another of discrete time division. He shows the latter, which is the most important for his purposes, to be formally related to certain systems of modal logic. An interpretation of this system yields an interesting definition of continuity of change and time. The definition is interesting because of its relation to another result which he derives, namely that this definition of continuity implies that the world sometimes will have to be described as being in two contradictory states at one time, a conclusion which he relates to Hegel's philosophy. This is an original and thought provoking essay.--R. H. K. (shrink)

A painstaking examination of theories of good and right in twentieth century British thought leads the author back to Kant, whose views are in turn exposed and criticized. Out of these investigations is developed a theory of good in terms of the dignity of man, which will account for the Kantian ideas of obligation and autonomy, yet give material content to ethical judgments. The concluding thesis is a challenge that an ultimate choice is required between the book's humanitarian view of (...) morality and maximalist views. No compromise is possible. The arguments are clear, cogent, and provocative. --R. H. K. (shrink)

The debate between hard and soft determinists is dealt with in this brief but interesting study. The author argues that there is no empirical dispute between hard and soft determinists. They draw different conclusions from the observed facts and these differences are the result of using different senses of the terms 'freedom' and 'moral responsibility'. Moritz Schlick's Problems of Ethics is the author's favored source for the soft determinist position and well-known articles by Paul Edwards and John Hospers the sources (...) for hard determinism. Other writers are quoted and briefly discussed. The treatment of many criticisms and countercriticisms is all too brief to do full justice to all the issues involved, but those topics which the author discusses are often illuminated. Interesting things are said about such topics as kleptomania, post-hypnotic suggestion, punishment, and excusable behavior. The book makes a convincing case, at least for the claim that a sophisticated version of the hard determinist position, such as appears in Hospers article, is only verbally different than many versions of soft determinism. Other versions of hard and soft determinism can and do come in substantive conflict with one another.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This is a careful analytical study of some of the central concepts of contemporary political thought. In separate chapters the author deals with the concepts of liberty, loyalty, power, and tolerance, exposing in the process some of the contradictions and confusions of contemporary American liberal and conservative thought. In the first chapter, which takes its point of departure from J. S. Mill's writings on liberty and political economy, Wolff shows that conservatives and liberals in the U.S. often share common principles (...) but disagree over the relevant facts. Since he thinks liberals have usually been right about the facts they have come, in his opinion, to dominate political debates. But the principles themselves need questioning, according to Wolff, and he formulates his own alternative in a final chapter entitled "Community." His aim in this final chapter is to rehabilitate the notion of the general or public good as distinct from the sum of the private goods of individuals, without falling into the totalitarian mold of various theories of the general good during the past few centuries. His ideas are not fully worked out in this chapter but they are interesting and stimulating. The other chapters on loyalty, power, and tolerance exemplify the two virtues which the book as a whole possesses. On the one hand they contain a careful analysis of the concepts involved, and on the other hand they represent a successful attempt to relate the analysis to current political problems.--R. H. K. (shrink)

In spite of the title, the author of this book asserts that its primary aim is to offer a reasonable account of the concepts of possibility and potentiality. His analysis of these concepts allows him to approach the free will controversy in his own way and to offer many interesting analyses and arguments bearing on the issue. He distinguishes three kinds of non-logical possibility: epistemic or relative possibility, natural possibility or natural power, and possibility of choice or personal power. He (...) thinks that the arguments for determinism have been based in one way or another on a failure to notice the subtle differences which exist between these three kinds of non-logical possibility. Although there is room for doubt that his analysis adds up to a decisive refutation of determinism, he has found many interesting differences between kinds of possibility and potentiality which bear on the free will issue and other philosophical issues as well. There is a discernible influence of Ryle and Austin on the book although both of these philosophers come in for criticism, especially Ryle for his failure to carefully separate the different meanings of 'power', 'tendency', 'capacity', and similar terms, and for his general commitment to the notion that all power is conditional. This latter thesis is one of the author's main targets.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This work gives a fresh approach to the discussion of psychological phenomena in philosophical terms. Beginning with a discussion of the emotions and feelings, it works back to a theory of willing and judging. The method is analytic, and the influence of Wittgenstein and Ryle is everywhere in evidence, though in different ways: the author usually improves on what Ryle, but simply approves of what Wittgenstein, says. In the final two chapters, the theory of judgment put forward by Geach in (...) Mental Acts is modified and extended to apply to acts of will, in the light of what has been said in the earlier chapters about emotions, feelings and desires.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Reichenbach wrote this book just after taking the first course Einstein ever taught on the theory of relativity. His important and influential work The Philosophy of Space and Time was written several years later and relied in part on the axiomatization of the special and general theories of relativity already worked out in this book. For special relativity Reichenbach divides his axioms into two sets, the light axioms which relate light signals to the topology and metric of time and space, (...) and the matter axioms which do the same for rigid rods and clocks. Thus the axioms focus on the conventions uniting theory and observation and give more insight into the physical foundations of the theory than do most axiomatizations. Reichenbach's approach has been criticized by Weyl and others, but at least some of the criticism seems to rest on a misunderstanding of what Reichenbach was attempting to do. Now that this early work has been translated into English, there is hope that it will be more widely read. There is no doubt that students of the theory or of recent philosophical discussion of space and time will profit from a careful reading of this book.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The author offers some interesting suggestions for the rewriting of the history of logic which modern developments in symbolic logic demand. He divides the history into two parts, the first dealing with what is called the Aristotelian core of logic and the improvements made on that core within a basically classical tradition, and the second, with the tradition of improvements inspired by Leibniz' idea of mathematical logic. The book is brief and much less of a comprehensive history than a prolegomena.--R. (...) H. K. (shrink)

In an introductory sketch of history of scholastic interest in aesthetics, the author notes the reawakening of Thomistic interest in this subject since the last century. He adds, with evidence drawn from nineteenth and twentieth century works, that this interest has been accompanied by methodological confusions and a misunderstanding of the theory of beauty of St. Thomas himself. He seeks to remedy this situation with a scholarly treatment of Aquinas' theory of beauty, divided into two parts; the first a genetic (...) investigation of the development of Thomas's ideas on beauty, the second a systematic account of the mature theory. A notable attempt to develop Aquinas' ideas on this subject from the entire corpus of his writings and not merely from the Summas and one or two other major works.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This is a translation of Jacob Klein's study "Die Griechische Logistik und die Entstehung der Algebra" which appeared in 1934-1936. His principal thesis is that the Renaissance mathematicians of the sixteenth century did not simply continue the work of the Greek and Arab mathematicians but in the process of developing ancient mathematics introduced a radically new conception of number which has since guided modern mathematical thought. The central figure in this revolution is Vieta. Klein traces the influence of Vieta's ideas (...) upon Stevin, Descartes, Wallis, and other figures of the scientific revolution, after discussing the conception of number and arithmetic in Plato, Aristotle, and other Greek sources. Persons reading this book with a primary interest in the philosophical ideas involved will be frustrated by the mass of historical detail which often obscures rather than illuminates the philosophical issues. But the book deserves its reputation as an important historical study.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Anyone interested in the highly active field of human communication will find this collection of essays by authors in different disciplines a very useful compendium of present results and problems. Communication theory is related in different essays to current work in Anthropology, Neurophysiology, Organization Theory, Philosophy of Language, Psychiatry, Psycholinguistics, Psychology, Sociology, and several other areas. The editor concludes with an essay "Toward a Theory of Human Communication." Each essay contains a very helpful bibliography of work in the appropriate area (...) and in addition the book contains a general bibliography prepared by Hugh Duncan which includes comments about the contents and nature of each book listed. The excellent essays of Searle and Fodor, Jenkins, and Saporta make the most direct connection with philosophical issues being widely discussed today, but most of the essays provide material which should be of interest to philosophers.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The German philosopher Rickert substituted for Hegel's formulation of the dialectic a "Heterological Principle of Thought" where identity and otherness become moments within the pure logical object of thought. The logical object of thought takes precedence over dialectical movement, and otherness takes precedence over negation. Flach expounds and defends Rickert's position against its critics. The discussion is specialized but contains some valuable insights into Hegel. --R. H. K.

This book considers some of the problems of a logical nature about reference which have troubled contemporary philosophers--particularly problems about existence, identity, and definite descriptions. It deals with five philosophers who have been especially concerned with these logical problems: Meinong, Frege, Russell, Strawson, and Quine. The pivotal chapters concern Russell's theory of descriptions and Strawson's well-known critique of that theory in his paper "On Referring." According to Linsky, some of Strawson's criticisms of Russell hit their mark; but not all of (...) them do, because Russell and Strawson turn out to have "compatible views about different subjects". Strawson is concerned with certain uses of words, Russell with propositions of certain kinds. Linsky's arguments on these matters are challenging precisely because they turn some of Strawson's own assumptions against him. But Strawsonians would surely want to carry the argument beyond this book by demanding a more thorough defense of the usefulness of introducing propositions into philosophical analysis as Russell does. Other noteworthy discussions of the book concern the consequences of Frege's semantics, substitutivity and impure reference in the chapter on Quine, and a discussion of extensionality and descriptions.--R. H. K. (shrink)